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ROMANIA, BULGARIA, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE RULES OF EMPOWERMENT AT
THE OUTSKIRTS OF EUROPE
Dana Neacsu*
I. INTRODUCTION

A

fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
came to Eastern Europe spreading the gospel of democracy and the American Rule of Law.1 In addition to encouraging
Western ideology, the United States was there to forge new
economic relationships and, following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, to accelerate the creation of military alliances through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the newly-formed “coalition of the willing.”2 Romania and Bulgaria, among other former Soviet satellites, welcomed the invitation.3
Romania and Bulgaria are small countries which share similar economic pressures as they attempt to emerge from troubled

* Dana Neacsu, reference librarian at Columbia Law School Library and
New York attorney; M.L.S. 2000 (City University of New York), LL.M. 1994
(Harvard), D.E.A. 1991 (Caen, France), J.D. 1989 (Bucharest, Romania). I
would like to thank Boyko Boev for his insightful suggestions. I am grateful,
also, to Michael Eisenberg and, especially, Julia Schneider and Erin
McMurray, as well as the other members of the editorial staff at the Brooklyn
Journal of International Law for their assistance with this article. As this
article grew out of a research paper for the International Studies Association
2004 Conference (March 17-20, 2004) entitled “Hegemony and Its Discontents,” Benjamin Judkins’ expert comments deserve a special mention.
1.American Bar Association, Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative
(“CEELI is a public service project of the American Bar Association that advances the rule of law in the world by supporting the legal reform process in
Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States of the former
Soviet Union.”), at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
2. NATO, Responding to New Security Threats, NATO IN THE 21
CENTURY, at 4-5, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_eng.pdf
(last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
3. Harvey Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva & Dan Reiter, Correspondence:
NATO and Democracy, 26 INT’L SECURITY 221, 225 (2001/2002).
ST
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political histories.4 When the United States, with its military
budget of $399 billion,5 approached Romania and Bulgaria seeking support for its global war against terror, both countries experienced a major transformation on a local and international
level. In what seems like a perfect example of Andy Warhol’s
notoriety allotment, for fifteen minutes the West gazed at them
in disbelief.6
Bulgaria and Romania, often intertwined by the West due to
their geographic proximity and common past,7 hope that the
new spotlight will lead to an enhanced international status as
they embark on a two-pronged strategy to achieve European
rapprochement via membership in NATO and the European
Union (EU). This Article argues, first, that Romania and Bulgaria would never have achieved the Western recognition they
enjoy today without shifts in U.S. foreign policy following the
September 11th attacks. Both NATO and the EU ignored Romania and Bulgaria during prior enlargement waves, which
relegated them to “the other Europe.”8 When Romania and
Bulgaria pledged allegiance to U.S. war interests, however, an
invitation to join NATO by 2004 followed.9
This Article also suggests that if Bulgarian and Romanian
NATO membership proves sufficient to ensure the kind of political stability on Europe’s eastern border that both the United
States and the EU desire, Romania and Bulgaria may witness a
setback in their second strategic prong of EU accession. Furthermore, given the current tension over the war in Iraq be4. C.I.A. THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2004) (one million people live below the
poverty line in Bulgaria and ten million people, half of the population, live
below the poverty line in Romania, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook (last visited Aug. 5, 2004)).
5. Id.
6. Glenn McNatt, Here, the “Setting” is More Worthy Than the “Stone,”
BALT. SUN, Sept. 4, 2004, at 1D (“In the 1960s, Pop artist Andy Warhol famously predicted that in the future ‘everyone will be famous for 15 minutes’.”).
7. F. Stephen Larrabee, Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and
Instability in the Balkans, 15 INT’L SECURITY 58, 61-62 (1990/1991).
8. Iulia Voina-Motoc, L’Europe Unie et l’Europe d’après le communisme:
rationalité et éthique de l’élargissement, in LES FRONTIÈRES DE L’EUROPE 172
(Elie Barnavi & Paul Goossens eds., 2001) (describing the cultural fertility of
the other Europe).
9. Zoltan Barany, NATO’s Peaceful Advance, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 70-72
(2004).
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tween the United States and some European countries, the EU
may be hesitant to add two pro-American, former Soviet satellites to its membership.10
Part II of this Article provides some background for Romania’s and Bulgaria’s geopolitical positions in broader Europe.
Part III looks at NATO enlargement, the impact of U.S. foreign
policy following September 11th, and Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
positions in both of these movements. Part IV examines the EU
and Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession processes in light of
their past Soviet alliances and current U.S. involvement. The
Article concludes by considering the impact of NATO involvement on EU membership for Romania and Bulgaria.
II. ROMANIA AND BULGARIA: IN THE WESTERN SPOTLIGHT
When the United States returned to a “pre-Watergate imperial presidency”11 and arrived in the forgotten Balkan area of
Europe12 (where country names change as quickly as Parisian
fashion), Romania and Bulgaria welcomed the nation. Until
then, both countries wrestled with the negative Western perception that they were unsuitable for foreign investment.13 Although Romania and Bulgaria offered foreign investors cheap
labor, currently fewer than two Euros per hour, most Western
companies steered clear because of their endemic corruption.14
As a result, Romania and Bulgaria were left out of the post-Cold
War capitalist prosperity witnessed by Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.15
The two countries are frequently paired together because
they share major cultural characteristics; their majority religion
10. John Darnton, Union, but Not Unanimity, As Europe’s East Joins West,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A1.
11. Melissa K. Matthews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 455, 473 n.131 (2002).
12. Barany, supra note 9, at 72. See also Charles Gati, The Forgotten Region, 19 FOREIGN POL’Y 135, 136 (1975).
13. See generally MARIA TODOROVA, IMAGINING THE BALKANS (1997); VoinaMotoc, supra note 8, at 170–83.
14. Crime and Corruption Keep Investors Away from Bulgaria, Warns Verheugen, EurActiv, at http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/2689903175?14&1015=7&1004=1507820 (June 9, 2004).
15. Jacques Rupnik, Eastern Europe: The International Context, 11 J.
DEMOCRACY 115, 123–25 (2000).

File: Neacsu 122704.doc

188

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:34 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:34 PM

[Vol. 30:1

is Orthodox Christianity and “they combine an old tradition of
rural underdeveloped societies with a recent tradition of high
communist socioeconomic interventionism.”16 As a result of
these characteristics, many in the West regard Romania and
Bulgaria as non-European, located, as the scholar Samuel P.
Harrington describes, behind a cultural “Velvet Curtain” which
buffers Western Europe from undesired Eastern cultural influences. 17
Until the end of the nineteenth century, Bulgaria and Romania spent a few centuries of their history under Ottoman rule.18
Upon gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in the
latter part of the nineteenth century, Romania and Bulgaria
attempted to redefine their national identities by merging their
previously fragmented territories.19 From those enhanced national positions, both countries began the long and complex
process of promoting their European identities.20 During the
interwar period, Romania and Bulgaria were mainly under authoritarian rule and, by the end of World War II, were formally
allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).21 As
during their isolation under Ottoman rule, Romania and Bulgaria again found themselves outside Europe, this time behind
the Iron Curtain.22 The non-Western label stayed with Romania
and Bulgaria until they renounced Soviet rule at the end of the

16. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi & Denisa Mindruta, Was Huntington Right?
Testing Cultural Legacies and the Civilization Border, 39 INT’L POL. 193, 196
(2002).
17. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 30, 30–31 (1993) (arguing that since the end of the Cold War, cultural
divisions (between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox
Christianity and Islam, on the other) have replaced ideological and political
boundaries). But see Mungiu-Pippidi & Mindruta, supra note 16, at 195.
18. Huntington, supra note 17, at 30–31 (1993).
19. Larrabee, supra note 7, at 74, 81.
20. NICOLAE IORGA, LE ROLE DES ROUMAINS DANS LA LATINITE : CONFERENCE
FAITE A L’ACADEMIE ROUMAINE [THE ROLE OF ROMANIANS IN LATIN CULTURE] 5–
6 (1919) (Iorga defined the location of Romania as “South Eastern Europe”).
21. Larrabee, supra note 7, at 60. See also TODOROVA, supra note 13, at
140 (Romania and Bulgaria were perceived as “a homogenous appendix of the
USSR”).
22. Huntington, supra note 17, at 30–31.
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twentieth century,23 at which time both countries expected to
join Europe and become successful capitalist societies.24 Western Europe did not, however, lay down a welcome mat, and Romania and Bulgaria found themselves still in “Europe’s own
near abroad.”25
Whether as a matter of national pride, economic need, or
both, Romania and Bulgaria see promise in aligning themselves
with the West, in particular Western Europe.26 To achieve this
goal, both countries are vying for membership in the EU and
NATO — two regional and, sometimes, adversarial organizations.27 Membership in the EU seems a rational desire from
both a symbolic and an economic perspective as it can bring
European identity and prosperity.28 NATO membership, on the
other hand, is a more problematic choice. Undeniably, NATO
membership can propel countries like Bulgaria and Romania to
more visible positions in the Western world. However, while
NATO membership establishes Romania’s and Bulgaria’s proWestern positions, it may not ally them more closely with
Europe.29 Additionally, NATO’s military requirements will certainly strain the meager budgets of these incipient democracies
and may even erode their social and political progress, both important in their own right and as criteria for EU accession.

23. Mark Kramer, The Collapse of East European Communism and the
Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part I), 5 J. COLD WAR STUD. 178,
190–91 (2003).
24. Id. at 179.
25. Charles King, The Europe Question in Romania and Moldova, in
AMBIVALENT NEIGHBORS: THE EU, NATO AND THE PRICE OF MEMBERSHIP 267
(Anatol Lieven & Dmitri Trenin eds., 2003).
26. Rupnik, supra note 15, at 116 (“Imitation of existing Western models
and reconnection with pre-communist past were seen as the quickest path to
democracy and prosperity.”).
27. Barany, supra note 9, at 64.
28. Rupnik, supra note 15, at 116.
29. Eugen Tomiuc, Romania, Bulgaria Seek Reassurances on 2007 Membership Bids, EU BUSINESS, Apr. 16, 2003, available at http://www.eubusiness.
com/imported/2003/04/108262.
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III. NATO: THE POINT OF CONVERGENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES, EUROPE, AND THE OTHER EUROPE
A. NATO Enlargement and the Post-Cold War Era
NATO was formed as a military organization in 1949 in response to Cold War politics and U.S. President Truman’s doctrine of Soviet containment. 30 The original members were ten
European countries, the United States, and Canada.31 Greece
and Turkey joined in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in
1955, and Spain in 1982.32 After the Cold War, NATO added the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all former members of
the defunct Warsaw Pact.33 Today, there are twenty-six NATO
members, among them Romania and Bulgaria as well as several
other former Soviet states.34
This post-Cold War enlargement has been defined as promoting the neo-Wilsonian premise that “international organization,
democracy, peace, and trade are all mutually reinforcing.”35 The
official U.S. position is that NATO enlargement will influence
and commit new members to adopt the values of Western democracy.36 Similarly, NATO proponents believe that taking in
new members from Central and Eastern Europe will revitalize
NATO by “expanding the frontiers of a stable and democratic
Europe.”37 Certainly, NATO members such as Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic perceive their membership as “an
ST

30. NATO IN THE 21 CENTURY, supra note 2, at 6.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Dan Reiter, Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy, 25
INT’L SECURITY 41, 41 (2001). See also Barany, supra note 9, at 64 (The Warsaw Pact had dissolved eight years earlier, in March 1991).
34. NATO, Organisation, available at http://www.nato.int/structur/count
ries.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
35. Reiter, supra note 33, at 44.
36. Barany, supra note 9, at 65 (“U.S. president Bill Clinton claimed that
NATO could ‘do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a
return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats,’ and
create the conditions for prosperity.”).
37. Charles Gati, NATO Enlargement: Who, Why, and How? 19 SAIS
REVIEW 211, 212 (1992). This purpose is strikingly similar to the EU
enlargement goal of “projecting political stability and strengthening Europe as
an economic power.” European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy Paper,
at 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/
strat_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
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agreement to [adopt NATO’s] rules and accede to its demands,
to be put into regular contact with its officials and its military
officers and its institutions and procedures, and to provide pervasive encouragement to reform and a ubiquitous presence of
examples of how it is done if you are ‘Western.’”38
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, some scholars believe that support for Cold War alliances and the U.S. unilateral military approach to foreign relations remain intact.39
From this perspective, the 2003 Iraq invasion is a logical continuation of these inclinations.40 Paradoxically, however, the
unilateral militarism directed against Iraq, a former Soviet protectorate, is at the same time empowering Romania and Bulgaria, two other former Soviet satellites.41
B. The United States and the Second Wave of NATO
Enlargement
The U.S. war on terror following the September 11th attacks
instigated a second wave of NATO enlargement. This effort
was commenced in November, 2002, when President Bush formally invited seven former Soviet satellite countries (including
Bulgaria and Romania) to join NATO.42 This was not the first
instance of U.S. military involvement in Southeastern Europe:
the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia forced the United
States and NATO to establish a presence in the area.43 In contrast to 1995, when the United States used NATO to conduct

38. Waterman et al., supra note 3, at 224–25.
39. See generally Gearóid Ó. Tuathail, The Bush Administration and the
‘End’ of the Cold War: A Critical Geopolitics of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1989, 23
GEOFORUM 437 (1992).
40. For an in-depth analysis of unilateralism as one of the salient elements
of the current administration’s security strategy, and its roots in U.S. history,
see JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
22-26 (2004).
41. Id. at 22.
42. Kjell M. Torbiorn, DESTINATION EUROPE: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH OF A CONTINENT 178-79 (2003).
43. NATO IN THE 21 CENTURY, supra note 2, at 16–17.
ST
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air strikes in Yugoslavia,44 this time, the United States offered
NATO membership as a reward for support of the war in Iraq.45
In order to put together its “coalition of the willing,” the
United States recruited Romania and Bulgaria, as well as other
former Soviet satellites such as Albania and Georgia.46 To the
United States, these states “ha[d] the resolve and fortitude to
act against [Iraq’s] threat to peace” where the “United Nations
Security Council [had] not lived up to its responsibilities.”47
Given Romania’s and Bulgaria’s economic positions and political histories, it appears unlikely that either Romania (considered by some to be “the region’s undisputed basket case”) or
Bulgaria would have been invited to join NATO absent their
participation in the U.S. coalition. 48
C. Romania and Bulgaria as Members of NATO and the
“Coalition of the Willing”
Romania and Bulgaria embraced the invitation to join NATO
and extended assistance to the United States more than either
country ever had.49 While Bulgaria only provided NATO with
an air corridor during the war in Kosovo,50 it currently has

44. Carlos L. Yordán, Resolving the Bosnian Conflict: European Solutions,
27 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 147, 148 (2003) (“[T]he U.S. solution involved a
mix of diplomacy and the use of NATO air strikes.”).
45. The Future of NATO: Do Bulgaria and Romania Qualify?, Hearing
th
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108 Cong. (Apr. 3,
2003) (statement of Janusz Bugajski, Director of the East European Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies), available at
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearing2003.html.
46. See Press Release, the White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mar.
20, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003
0320-11.html.
47. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq (Mar. 17,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003
0317-7.html.
48. Barany, supra note 9, at 71. See also Bulgaria: NATO Member a Year
After Iraqi War, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SERVICE, Mar. 19, 2004, available at
2004 WL 64007654 (Bulgaria’s NATO membership “would have been impossible without a green light from the United States.”).
49. Barany, supra note 9, at 72.
50. Id.
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troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq.51 Similarly, during the
war in Yugoslavia, Romania limited its NATO contribution to
the terms of the economic embargo. Now it, too, has troops in
both Afghanistan and Iraq.52 This marks a dramatic shift for
Romania and Bulgaria, from involuntary subservience to the
former Soviet Union spawned by fear of Soviet occupation,53 to
voluntary acquiescence to the United States prior to the reward
of NATO membership.54
As many commentators have pointed out, economic prosperity, more than military capacity, is necessary to consolidate democracy.55 However, it appears unlikely that Bulgaria and Romania will reap economic benefits from the presence of NATO
troops in their territories. In the past, entire German villages
built their futures around U.S. military bases; today, the United
States plans to cut its NATO spending, in part by reducing the
total number of soldiers it has stationed in Germany, rather
than relocating them to cheaper places like Bulgaria and Romania.56 Furthermore, NATO membership may play a nefarious role in helping Romania’s and Bulgaria’s military sectors
achieve budgetary allocations at the expense of other sectors
like public education and health care.57
Moreover, it is likely that Romania and Bulgaria will endure
more economic adversity as a result of their military involvement.58 For example, the United States has asked Bulgaria to
forgive Iraq’s pre-1989 debt of two billion dollars, which repre-

51. J. Harrop, Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States, 81 SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV.
789, 789–91 (2003) (book review).
52. Powell Thanks Romania for Help in Afghanistan and Iraq (Oct. 27,
2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2004/Jan/30-258852.html.
53. Kramer, supra note 23, at 200.
54. See generally NORMS AND NANNIES: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS ON THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES (Ronald H. Linden ed., 2002) (discussing how Western leaders use membership in NATO and
the EU to gain acceptance of their norms and standards).
55. Waterman et al., supra note 3, at 233.
56. Judy Dempsey, US Plans to Cut Troops in Europe by a Third,
FINANCIAL TIMES, at 4 (Feb. 3, 2004).
57. See Reiter, supra note 33, at 51.
58. Romania, A New and Close American Ally, Talking Proud (Archives
International), at http://www.talkingproud.us (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
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sents 10% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).59 Iraq’s debt to
Romania is valued at $1.7 billion,60 and will likely remain unpaid so long as Romania is a close U.S. ally.61 In exchange for
these sacrifices, neither Romania nor Bulgaria has received financial support for its involvement in the war or any Iraqi reconstruction contracts.62 Although there is quid pro quo with
respect to Romania’s and Bulgaria’s NATO membership, and
possibly some future economic relief as a result of their coalition
involvement, NATO membership will not provide the economic
and political stability these young democracies so desperately
need.
Finally, successful NATO membership may have the unexpected impact of impeding Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accessions
to the EU. The growing division between rich and poor at the
outskirts of Europe clearly raises the risk of unrest and chaos
for Western Europe.63 This is one reason why the EU has increased its membership in the border regions.64 NATO’s involvement in Eastern Europe may provide enough stability to
make EU expansion unnecessary.65 At the same time, in light of
the current tensions between the United States and Europe
over the war on terror, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s increased involvement in NATO may make them too pro-United States for
Europe.66
Although Romania’s and Bulgaria’s involvement in the coalition has put both countries on the map, it has also exposed

59. Interview by Irina Grozdeva with Marc Grossman, Undersecretary for
Political Affairs (July 22, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/p/
34816pf.htm.
60. Romania, a New and Close American Ally, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Tomiuc, supra note 29. The goal of EU enlargement (to “improve [the
EU’s] capacity to safeguard Europe’s environment, to combat crime, to improve social conditions and to manage migratory pressures”) is evidence that
the EU is concerned with this risk. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note
37, at 4.
64. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 3.
65. Rob de Wijk, European Military Reform for a Global Partnership, 27
WASH. Q. 197, 197-210 (2003) (arguing for NATO’s historical and current role
ensuring security on both sides of the Atlantic).
66. Jan Zielonka, Challenges of EU Enlargement, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 22, 2526 (2004).
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them to European scrutiny over the war in Iraq.67 France and
Germany, in particular, have voiced criticism of Romania’s and
Bulgaria’s participation.68
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE OUTSKIRTS OF EUROPE
A. The Emergence of the European Union
The EU originated in the 1948 Hague Congress and the 1950
Schuman Declaration, which sought economic solutions to postWorld War II problems in Germany and France.69 Under
Winston Churchill’s leadership, it excluded both the Communist
Left and the Far Right from participating.70 These, however,
were mostly symbolic beginnings. The real landmark institutions of the EU are the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),71 and the two Treaties
of Rome establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community.72 The
ECSC and the EEC share the same six original members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.73
The EEC Treaty included provisions for a customs union, a
common commercial policy, a common transport policy, and a
limited monetary policy.74 In addition to these economic provi67. Doug Bereuter and John Lis, Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship, 27 WASH. Q. 147, 147 (2003) (the war in Iraq brought transatlantic tensions to center stage).
68. Ken Adelman, Romania Knows - Been There; Ready to Help Iraq, National Review Online (Nov. 4, 2003), at http://www.nationalreview.com/com
ment/adelman200311040812.asp (“While no great military might, and with
gobs of domestic priorities grabbing its leaders, Romania posts 1,800 troops in
the two newly liberated nations. Other Europeans — especially French and
Germans — ask why Romanians divert scarce resources to aid these Islamic
states.”).
69. DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 37
(2004) (Robert Schuman, France’s Foreign Minister, linked the consolidation
of French and German coal markets to the goal of wider European integration).
70. Id. at 23.
71. Treaty of Paris, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
72. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty of Rome, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 140; see generally DINAN, supra note 69, at 76–79.
73. DINAN, supra note 69, at 46–57.
74. Id. at 77.
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sions, the EEC Treaty formulated political and judicial institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament,
and the European Court.75 These new institutions, as well as
the subsequent Single European Act,76 further buttressed the
supranational character of the EEC and opened the doors to
European integration.77
Though, officially, the EEC remained an economic organization until the 1990s, European integration commenced with its
inception.78 Given the EU’s complex origins, it should come as
no surprise that its accession process requires both a political
and economic analysis of each candidate for membership.79
Such scrutiny occurred even when Britain, Ireland, and Denmark acceded in the 1970s,80 as well as during Greece’s accession in 1981, and Spain’s and Portugal’s in 1986.81 For each of
these countries, the accession process lasted six years.82
During the 1990s, new challenges of globalization and shortlived, but propitious, economic times changed the official nature
of the EEC.83 As a result of the EEC’s focus on the implementation of the single market program, a greater sense of political
and economic integration ensued.84 Finally, the EEC gave way
to the EU in December 1991, and started to resemble a federation in many political and economic respects.85 This shift concluded with the Treaty on European Union.86 During this time,
the EU was focused on regional economic and social issues, with
mixed results: “the single market remained a work in progress;
unemployment stayed stubbornly high; sustainable develop-

75. Id.
76. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503
(1986).
77. DINAN, supra note 69, at 205.
78. Id. at 206.
79. See, e.g., Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 15–24.
80. DINAN, supra note 69, at 135–47.
81. Id. at 169–71.
82. Id. at 190.
83. Id. at 205.
84. Id. at 216–19.
85. See generally Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Constitutional
Order? Between Community Method and Ad Hoc Compromise, 18 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 1 (2000).
86. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224)
1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). See also DINAN, supra note 69, at 233.
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ment […] was easier to proclaim than to achieve; and agriculture and cohesion seemed impervious to reform.”87
Despite these challenges, or perhaps in response to them, the
EU took on the task of enlargement towards the East. The first
wave brought in Austria, Sweden, and Finland in the mid1990s;88 the next was intended to address Cold War remnants in
Central and Eastern Europe.89 The former Soviet satellites
which, after achieving independence, dreamed of rejoining capitalist Europe, welcomed this move.90 The first such entrée occurred in 1990, when the EU presented Europe Agreements to
some former Soviet satellites.91 These agreements were part of
a pre-accession strategy92 and provided a bilateral legal and political framework tailored to support the state’s political and
economic transition towards capitalism.93
The first Europe Agreements were signed in 1991 with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic.94 In
1993, agreements were signed with Romania and Bulgaria, and
in 1995 and 1996 similar agreements were signed with other
Central and Eastern European countries.95 This network established a free trade area for industrial goods. By the beginning
of the twenty-first century, this block of former Soviet satellites
represented the EU’s second largest trading partner after the
United States.96
Although the EU signed Europe Agreements with its Eastern
neighbors, it did not seriously consider them potential candidates for accession until the Copenhagen European Council in
1993.97 For the first time, the Copenhagen Conclusions identi87. DINAN, supra note 69, at 266.
88. Id. at 268–70.
89. Id. at 265.
90. Rupnik, supra note 15, at 116.
91. Marc Maresceau, From Europe Agreements to Accession Negotiations,
in L’EUROPA DI DOMANI: VERSO L’ALLARGAMENTO DELL’UNIONE. EUROPE
TOMORROW/TOWARD THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE UNION 15 (Mario Ganino &
Gabriella Venturini eds., 2002).
92. See generally Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 9 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003).
93. Id. at 15–17.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 23.
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fied the political and economic conditions an applicant had to
satisfy to become a member.98
Documents of accession particularized the economic and political conditions each state must achieve. States achieve membership when existing EU members sign the Accession Treaty
and the candidate ratifies it.99 Between 1994 and 1996, ten
countries closer to the West, including Poland and the Czech
Republic, ended their pre-accession phases and concluded applications for EU membership.100
The process of accession, as described in the 1995 EU Commission’s White Paper,101 is based on a “structured dialogue”
aimed at integrating candidates into the EU single market.102
Guided by that document, in 1997 the Commission recommended commencing accession negotiations with five former
Soviet satellites: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia,
and Slovenia.103
In 2000, the EU opened accession negotiations with Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.104 Romania and
Bulgaria, however, were omitted from the Commission’s 2002
recommendations for accession, due to their poor economic and
political performance.105 Eventually, all of the above, except

98. Id. at 25.
[The] candidate countries must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing protection of minorities.” They must also be able
to guarantee “the existence of a functioning market economy as well
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
within the Union.” Membership assumes “the candidate’s ability to
take on obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic, and monetary union.”
Id.
99. European Union, Enlargement of the European Union and Accession
Negotiations, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/tfan/enl_en.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2004).
100. DINAN, supra note 69, at 274.
101. See generally WHITE PAPER: PREPARATION OF THE ASSOCIATED
COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE
INTERNAL MARKET OF THE UNION (COM 95) 163, May 10, 1995, available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001120/01/east_enlarg_wp_COM_95_163.pdf.
102. Id. at 3.
103. DINAN, supra note 69, at 276.
104. Id. at 277.
105. Id. at 279.
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Romania and Bulgaria, became EU members on May 1, 2004.106
The new members, however, cannot fully participate in the EU
but, instead, benefit from limited transitional arrangements
known as derogations from the acquis communautaire (the laws
and rules of the EU).107
B. Romania and Bulgaria: The Accession Process
In 2000, the EU’s political assessment of Romania and Bulgaria was moderately positive.108 Despite poor treatment of
Roma minorities, the two candidates were cited for free and fair
elections.109 The 2000 Report describes Bulgaria’s economic record in more encouraging terms than Romania’s, noting that
Bulgaria “has clearly made further progress towards becoming
a functioning market economy.”110
Since Romania made its bid for EU membership, it has consistently occupied last place among negotiating countries.111
Commentators describe its economic and political record as
dismal.112 In fact, despite a Latin heritage which could link it to
France, Spain, and Italy, the EU views Romania’s political, social, and cultural heritage as an obstacle to its integration into
EU institutions.113 This is quite a damaging perception for the

106. Zielonka, supra note 66, at 22.
107. Kirstyn Inglis, The Accession Treaty and its Transitional Arrangements: A Twilight Zone for the New Members of the Union, in EU
ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 77 (Christophe Hillion ed., 2004). See also
Michael Dougan, A Spectre is Haunting Europe…Free Movement of Persons
and the Eastern Enlargement, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 111
(Christophe Hillion ed., 2004) (free movement of workers is one area of the
acquis for which the EU has negotiated transitional derogations).
108. European Commission, Romania 2000: 2000 Regular Report from the
Commission on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession 87 (Nov. 8, 2000),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/ro_
en.pdf; European Commission, Bulgaria 2000: 2000 Regular Report from the
Commission on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession 87 (Nov. 8, 2000),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/bg_
en.pdf.
109. Romania 2000, supra note 108, at 14, 24; Bulgaria 2000, supra note
108, at 13, 22.
110. Bulgaria 2000, supra note 108, at 34.
111. King, supra note 25, at 257.
112. Id. at 256.
113. Id.
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Romanian bid considering the EU’s historical emphasis on a
regional cultural identity.114
Despite Romanian and Bulgarian commonalities, Geoffrey
Van Orden, Vice Chairman of the EU Foreign Affairs Committee, has made an effort to distinguish Bulgaria, insisting that
its accession date should not be tied to that of any other state.115
Even while the European Parliament debated whether to call
for a reorientation of the EU's accession strategy with Romania,116 Commissioner Franz Fischler was giving hope to Bulgaria
that its accession treaty could be signed in 2005.117 In June
2004, however, Günther Verheugen, the EU Commissioner responsible for EU enlargement, contradicted that statement and
reaffirmed the 2007 accession date for Bulgaria.118 Verheugen
warned that Bulgaria's economic development was being impeded by problems with corruption and organized crime.119
Romania’s main problem has been its inability to establish a
market economy. Since the regime change in 1989, the standard of living for ordinary people has been steadily declining:
in 1999, more than one-third of Romanians lived in poverty.120
Internally, some saw this decline as evidence of a functioning
market economy.121 Unlike the previous regime’s corruption,

114. George A. Bermann, Editorial, The European Union as a Constitutional
Experiment, 10 EUR. L.J. 363, 364 (2004).
115. News Report, European Parliament, Bulgaria Well on the Way to EU
Membership (Feb. 20, 2004), available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/
omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+NR-20040220-1+0+DOC+XML+
V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S.
116. Parliament Raises Doubts over Romania’s Accession, EurActiv, at
http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/234952-2?714&1015=7&1014=p
20024e (Feb. 20, 2004).
117. Press Release, European Commission, “Bulgaria’s EU Accession Within
Reach,” says EU Farm Commissioner Fischler, Mar. 16, 2004, available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/356&forma
t=HTML&aged=language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
118. Crime and Corruption Keep Investors Away from Bulgaria, Warns Verheugen, supra note 14 (Verheugen stated: "Everyone can be assured Bulgaria
will be a full, equal, and responsible member of the EU by January 2007.").
119. Id.
120. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, A DECADE LATER:
UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN ROMANIA 8 (2001/2002), available
at http://www.undp.ro/publications/pdf/NHDR.pdf.
121. Ioana Speteanu, Grabbe: ‘Cartea aderarii se joaca la masa politicului,’
48 CAPITAL, Nov. 27, 2003, at 7 (Romanian journalists debate whether the EU
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which allowed wealth stratification, the current regime makes
it legal for few to prosper at the expense of many.122 However,
Romanians see the sacrifice of half of the Romanian population123 supporting a free market economy with their poverty and
unemployment, where EU officials see Romanian socioeconomic
collapse.124
Although Bulgaria closed its accession negotiation chapters
by the summer of 2004 while Romania has closed only twentyseven chapters, the EU has not officially decided to split the two
countries’ accession processes.125 As recently as October 2004
the Commission has stated that it “expects Romania to assume
the obligations of membership in accordance with the envisaged
time frame.”126 Thus, it appears that the Commission’s vision
for a 2007 accession date for both states may come to fruition.127
Furthermore, the differences between Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
accession progress will likely remain inconsequential against
the backdrop of interplay between the EU and the United
States, which will dictate the changes in that part of the world.
As a result of economic need and their desire to belong to
Western Europe,128 Romania and Bulgaria were willing to endure seven years of pre-accession negotiations over economic
and political criteria.129 Their prospects, even if all goes well,
appear to be “a sort of twilight zone, somewhere between the

terms of economic criteria (functioning market economy) are properly defined).
122. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 120, at 6.
123. See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 4.
124. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 53.
125. EU May Split Bulgaria, Romania Applications, EurActiv, available at
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-130181-16&type=News (Sept.
3, 2004).
126. European Commission, 2004 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress
Towards Accession 146 (2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/en
largement/report_2004/pdf/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf.
127. Commission Confirms Jan 2007 Entry Date for Romania, EurActiv,
available at http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-130564-16&type=
News (Oct. 7, 2004).
128. Bulgaria and Romania are poorer than the newly-admitted EU members, which themselves are strikingly poor by comparison to Western Europe.
See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Beyond the New Borders, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 48, 50
(2004).
129. See Darnton, supra note 10, at A1.
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pre-accession strategy and membership on a par” with existing
member states.130
V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF NATO INVOLVEMENT ON EU
ACCESSION
While Romania and Bulgaria see EU membership as the
ticket to economic prosperity, for the EU such enlargement only
makes sense as a measure to ensure political stability within
European borders and to increase the EU’s role as a counterweight to U.S. supremacy.131 In this sense, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s chances and timelines for accession depend not only on
meeting internal requirements, but also on the nature of the
interplay among the EU, NATO, and the United States.
The addition of ten new members in May 2004 has already
prompted concerns about the EU’s future and whether it should
take an intergovernmental or supranational form.132 Some observers characterize the 2004 enlargement as an act of “West
European charity toward neighbors in the continent’s East,” but
recognize that the EU is also acting in its own self-interest.133
The issue is further complicated by inconsistencies between
popular opinion demonstrated by polling data and the official
EU position on enlargement. In a 2003 survey conducted
among 1,453 executives at major European companies, 57%
considered the EU to have achieved its critical mass at twentyfive states and only 6% supported the candidacies of Bulgaria
and Romania.134 Nevertheless, the official position is that the
EU is centrally concerned with “moving from division to unity,
from a propensity for conflict to stability, and from economic
inequality to better life-chances in the different parts of
Europe.”135

130. Inglis, supra note 107, at 108.
131. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND
EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003) (Rationalizing Europe’s aspiration to
balance the United States’ world power).
132. KJELL M. TORBIÖRN, DESTINATION EUROPE: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF A CONTINENT 140–41 (2003).
133. Zielonka, supra note 66, at 22.
134. UPS EUROPE BUSINESS MONITOR, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY XIII 20 (2003),
available at http://www.ebm.ups.com/europe/ebmxiii/img/EBMXIII_UK.pdf.
135. Enlargement Strategy Paper, supra note 37, at 3.
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Even if the official position promotes enlargement, the future
direction of the EU is difficult to ascertain, with possible results
ranging from a “United States of Europe” to a conglomerate of
states with few institutions in common, a “kind of neomedieval
empire.”136 It is also possible that some of the problems the EU
faces may already be determinative of its future. For example,
there is increasing hostility towards the work forces of new
members; borders are, therefore, likely to remain hard and
well-fixed. Furthermore, there is currently little consensus
about unified EU political bodies, such as its Parliament, suggesting that the EU will never become a federation reminiscent
of the United States.137
On the other hand, if the EU gives way to more institutional
supranationalism by building on its existing supranational
monetary policy, integrating countries with different cultural
and religious backgrounds may affect the EU’s capacity to function through compromise rather than majority rule.138 The
prospect of such a shift may result in a preemptive halt to accession of “Velvet Curtain” countries such as Romania and Bulgaria.
Also at play is the impression among Western European
countries that the EU must provide a counterbalance to the
United States. As such, the EU may be wary of bringing in too
many pro-U.S. states.139 New EU members, and candidates
such as Romania and Bulgaria, run the risk of being perceived
as “American Trojan horse[s]” due to their NATO and coalition
involvement.140 Compounding the problem for Romania and
Bulgaria is the fact that the EU is also nervous about former
Soviet values, such as “paternalism, populism, and corruption”
entering the EU through the 2004 and later enlargements.141
Thus, their pro-Soviet past and pro-American present leave
Romania and Bulgaria stuck between the proverbial rock and
hard place.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Zielonka, supra note 66, at 27–30.
Id. at 33.
TORBIÖRN, supra note 132, at 140–59.
Zielonka, supra note 66, at 25.
Id.
Id. at 31.

